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How Taxes and Benefits Can Discourage Work
In Britain, as in most other Western economies,
the government administers a bewildering range of taxes and welfare
benefits in its efforts to achieve a number of ambitious objectives—the
relief of poverty through redistribution of income towards the
long-term poor; social insurance to help mitigate the effects of the
great hazards of life (e.g., unemployment, family breakdown, and
long-term illness or disability); and an attempt to smooth out income
levels over an individual’s life cycle.1
On the face of it, these are laudable aims, approved by many
Christians. But they have a number of unintended and not-so-beneficial
consequences, not the least of which is the way this tax/benefit system
discourages work.
This can happen in two ways. First, working people
on low incomes may be dissuaded from working longer hours, getting a
second job, or getting a slightly better job. The problem is simply
that they may gain very little financially. A “poverty trap” comes
about when a person’s gross earnings from working harder increase while his or her net
earnings (after income tax and national insurance deductions and the
loss of welfare benefits) amount to little or nothing—or even a loss.
Second, the “unemployment trap” occurs when living idly on benefits is
more lucrative than holding a job.2
Consider this poverty-trap example: A couple with
no children earns together just £14,000 annually. For the financial
year 2009-2010, they pay £548 in combined tax and national insurance
contributions. Over the same period, they receive a state welfare
benefit for low-income working families (the “working tax credit”) of
£1129. This gives them a net income of £14,581. But if they decide to
work longer hours and increase their combined pay to £16,000 a year,
their tax and national insurance contributions would increase to
£1,168, whilst their working tax credit would fall to £569.3
This leaves them with a net household income of £15,431. So although
they gain an extra £2000 from work, they are only £820 better off. In
other words, they pay an “effective” tax rate of 59% on the extra
income.
A 2006 study by London’s Institute for Fiscal Studies4
found that over two million workers stood to similarly lose more than
half of any small increase in their earnings. And around 160,000 would
actually lose 90%—far higher than the marginal tax rate on the
wealthiest people.5 The study
concluded that although the government had pledged to “make work pay,”
the extension of means-tested benefits actually exacerbates both the
poverty and unemployment trap, increasing the disincentive to work.
Christians know from their study of the Bible that
work is both a duty and a blessing, so there must be something
seriously wrong with government policies which, innocently or not, end
up discouraging people from more employment.
| 1 |
For instance, the
tax on people at peak earning power in their middle years can be used
both to provide state retirement pensions for those towards the end of
their lives and state welfare support for struggling young families.
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| 2 |
The proportion of a
person’s net income that will be replaced by the benefits system if he
lost his job is referred to as the “replacement” ratio. Replacement
ratios of over 100% are by no means unknown in Britain today, although
the situation was marginally worse in the early 1990s.
|
| 3 |
Since working tax
credit is regarded as a “gateway” benefit, receipt of which makes it
possible for the claimant to receive a whole range of benefits like
free medicine prescriptions, free optician and dental care, etc., the
complete loss of working tax credit leads to the loss of many other
benefits and could lead to higher real effective tax rates than shown
in this example.
|
| 4 |
Stuart Adam, Mike Brewer, and Andrew Shephard, The Poverty Trade-off: Work Incentives and Income Redistribution in Britain. Available at the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Website, http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/poverty-trade-work-incentives-and-income-redistribution-britain (accessed August 4, 2009).
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| 5 |
The combined burden
of income taxes and national insurance contributions in the UK on the
very wealthy for the 2009-10 financial year is 51%—the top rate of
income tax being 40% (paid on incomes over £37,400) and the rate for
national insurance contribution being 11%. |